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Abstract 
How do young children represent pretend play? One possibility is that recognizing and 
representing pretend play depends on children’s ability to infer the mental states of the person 
engaged in pretend play (mentalist account). The two dominant alternative possibilities are that 
children view as a distinctive form of non-representational behavior (behavioral account), and 
that children represent pretense by temporarily treating objects as though they have fictional or 
make-believe properties (flagging account). This chapter provides an overview of the debate 
between these three accounts of pretend play, but then endorses a fourth position according to 
which children view pretend play as a form of communication, similar in many ways to drawing.  
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Like many human activities, pretend play has behavioral and mental components. Consider a 
child pretending to drink juice from an empty cup. He lifts the empty cup close to his mouth, tilts 
the cup back comically, and makes loud slurping noises. The child produces these distinct 
behaviors because of his mental states, whereby he intentionally misrepresents the empty cup as 
containing juice. Other children who see this behavior will recognize it as pretense. If the child 
pretends to pour juice into an empty cup, other children will expect him to “drink” from that cup.  
They would be surprised if he instead drank from a different cup, even though both are empty. 
This ability to recognize pretense appears as early as 15 or 16 months (Bosco, Friedman, & 
Leslie, 2006; Onishi, Baillargeon, & Leslie, 2007), with children recognizing increasingly more 
sophisticated forms of pretense as they enter the preschool years (e.g., Harris, Kavanaugh, & 
Meredith, 1994; Walker-Andrews & Harris, 1993). How do children do recognize and represent 
pretend play? Do they consider overt behaviors of pretend play and the mental states that 
underlie and cause these behaviors? Do they consider the behaviors alone? Or is there some 
other way they can recognize pretense? 
As these questions show, pretend play provides a window onto young children’s 
representational abilities. If children consider mental states in representing pretend play, then 
their ability to represent pretend play is a form of mental state reasoning or theory of mind 
(Leslie, 1987). Alternatively, children might view pretense only as a distinctive form of 
behavior, at least until they are about five or six years of age (e.g., Lillard, 1993a; see chapter 
10).  Or children might represent pretense by treating objects as though they temporarily have 
fictional identities and properties (Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993). These three positions offer 
differing claims about how children represent pretend play and they are also compatible with 
differing accounts of cognitive development and young children’s representational abilities. This 
chapter provides an admittedly biased overview of the debate among these three positions, and 
then endorses a new account according to which children view pretend play as form of 
communication.  
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. First we outline the claim that children 
are mentalists about pretend play, with discussion of evidence that is often viewed (mistakenly, 
in my opinion) as contradicting this account. Next we review and critique the claim that children 
view pretense solely in terms of the overt behaviors produced. Then we discuss the view that 
children recognize pretend play by temporarily representing objects as having fictional properties 
and identities. Finally we return to the mentalist account. Although this account succeeds in 
explaining essential features of children’s pretend play, new challenges are raised, and an 
alternative “communicative” account is proposed, according to which children view pretend play 
as a form of communication.  
The Mentalist Account 
According to the mentalist account, young children’s ability to represent pretend play is an early 
emerging form of theory of mind (Leslie, 1987, 1994). To understand this claim, it helps to begin 
by briefly discussing mental states and theory of mind. Mental states such as believe, hope, 
imagine, intend, and want are propositional attitude mental states. Each relates an agent (e.g., 
Max) to a propositional content (e.g., the cup contains juice). Thus, Max might believe that the 
cup contains juice, or he might hope, imagine, want, or intend this.1 Which mental state Max has 
in regard to the juice depends on how Max represents the world, rather than on how the world 
actually is. Max could believe (or hope, or imagine) that a certain cup contains juice even if the 
cup is actually empty, or even if there is no such cup. (Perhaps Max has made a mistake, and the 
“cup” is actually a small vase.) What differs for these different mental states is the attitude Max 
takes to the propositional content “There is juice in the cup.” 
Theory of mind is the ability to reason about and represent such propositional attitude 
mental states.2 It is widely agreed that attributing a mental state implies possession of the 
corresponding mental state concept. For example, if Sally represents Max as believing something 
(e.g., that the cup contains juice), this implies that she possesses the concept believe. And 
because beliefs are representational, when Sally attributes a belief to Max, she represents him as 
representing, and thus engages in meta-representation.  
Researchers interested in the relationship between pretense and theory of mind often ask 
whether engaging in pretense facilitates the development of theory of mind, and whether doing 
so sometimes requires children to consider others’ intentions, thoughts, and beliefs (e.g., 
Astington & Jenkins, 1995; Rosen, Schwebel, & Singer, 1997; Schwebel, Rosen, & Singer, 
1999; Taylor & Carlson, 1997). These questions concern the relation between pretense and 
theory of mind abilities that are distinct frompretense.  In contrast, the view that children are 
mentalists about pretense posits a much closer connection between pretense and theory of mind; 
it claims that representing a person as pretending is a form of theory of mind.  
The basis of this claim is that pretend is a propositional attitude mental state. Just as Max 
might believe, hope, or imagine that some cup contains juice, he can also pretend this. Pretend 
shares key properties with propositional attitude mental states, such as believe. If Max 
mistakenly believes the empty cup contains juice, then he misrepresents its content. The same is 
true if Max knowingly pretends that it contains juice. There are of course many differences 
between believe and pretend. For instance, it is possible to believe without being able to 
represent oneself or others as believing, but it does not seem possible to pretend without having 
the ability to represent pretense (Leslie, 2002, p. 107). But there are also many differences 
among all of the various propositional attitude mental states. The main point is that the mentalist 
theory claims that pretend is a mental state, and this means that the concept pretend is a mental 
state concept. 
As noted, children age 15 and 16 months recognize others’ pretense. Just as attributing 
beliefs depends on the child’s possession of the mental state concept believe, the mentalist 
account posits that recognizing pretense depends on the child’s possession of the mental state 
concept pretend. When Sally recognizes Max’s pretense, she uses this concept to represent, Max 
pretends the cup contains juice. By entertaining this representation, Sally represents Max’s 
mental state of pretending, and thereby engages in theory of mind.4 In doing so Sally also 
engages in meta-representation; in representing Max as pretending, Sally represents him as 
representing.  
The mentalist account claims that recognizing and representing Max’s pretense requires 
Sallyto use the mental state concept pretend. But how does Sally come to recognize what Max is 
pretending? According to the mentalist account, Sally’s ability to do so requires her to interpret 
the behaviors he produces on the basis of his pretense. In pretending the cup contains juice, it 
would be odd if Max produced the exact actions he would take if juice were really in the cup. If 
Max closely mimicked real drinking, Sally would have difficulty recognizing his pretense, and 
might wrongly judge that he actually believes the cup contains juice.5 Rather than behaving 
normally, Max instead lifts the empty cup close to his mouth without actually having it touch his 
mouth, tilts it back comically, and makes loud slurping noises. These actions feature manner 
cues typical of pretense, including exaggerated motions, and knowing looks and smiles (e.g., 
Lillard & Witherington, 2004). Max’s actions are suggestive of there being juice in the cup, but 
are not likely to lead Sally or anyone else to think that there really is juice in the cup, or that Max 
believes there is. Thus, Max’s distinctive behavior expresses both that he is pretending, and also 
what he is pretending (e.g., this cup contains juice, and I drink it). On this view, Sally recognizes 
Max’s pretense because she realizes that he is not behaving regularly (i.e., behaving on the basis 
of his actual beliefs and desires about the world), and that his behavior is better explained by 
supposing that he is trying to express what he pretends. For extended discussion of this view of 
how children recognize pretense, see Leslie and Happé (1989).  
Against the Mentalist Account, and Moe the Troll 
The claim that children are mentalists about pretense has aroused much skepticism because if 
children’s representation of pretense requires their possession of the mental state concept 
pretend, this implies that 15- and 16-months olds are already engaging in a form of theory of 
mind. It is difficult to see how such young children could come to possess the mental state 
concept pretend through learning, and so the mentalist account is more compatible with the 
alternative possibility that children are innately endowed with this mental state concept, and 
perhaps others, like belief (e.g., Leslie, 1987, 1994). The conclusion that children are innately 
endowed with abstract mental state concepts is unpalatable for many, and contradicts claims that 
the acquisition of these concepts is an achievement of the preschool years, and the result of 
children learning and devising theories about minds and mental states (e.g., Gopnik & Wellman, 
1994; Perner, 1991; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).  
This skepticism led to the development of a body of empirical work seeking to provide 
evidence against the mentalist account. Much of the work follows from Lillard’s (1993b) 
influential Moe the troll experiments. In these experiments, children watch scenarios about Moe 
the troll who, for example, does not know what a kangaroo is, but who is nonetheless described 
as jumping up and down like a kangaroo. Children are asked whether Moe is pretending to be a 
kangaroo. For adults it is obvious that a person pretending to be a kangaroo must know about 
kangaroos, and is likely to be thinking about being one. But children age four and five often 
claim that Moe pretends to be a kangaroo, even while admitting that he does not know what a 
kangaroo is, and that he is not thinking about being a kangaroo. For Lillard (1993b, 2001) these 
findings suggest that children focus on Moe’s behavior (jumping up and down) in deciding 
whether he is pretending and neglect to consider the mental states that underlie this behavior. 
From the claim that children seem oblivious to the mental states underlying Moe’s behavior 
when he pretends, it is concluded that children are not mentalists about pretense. 
Many experiments have followed up Lillard’s (1993b) original Moe the troll findings, 
with some experiments replicating four- and five-year-olds’ difficulty, and others suggesting that 
children at these ages can succeed in modified versions of the task (see Lillard, 2001 for an 
excellent review of much of this work). But aside from the question of when children first 
correctly reason about the knowledge, thoughts, and intentions that are required for pretending, is 
the separate question of whether any of these findings actually bear, as they are often claimed to, 
on the mentalist account.  
The Moe the troll task suggests that children are not aware of certain mental states that 
accompany pretending, such as knowledge of kangaroos, and thoughts about being a kangaroo. 
However, the mentalist theory does not claim that children are aware of all the mental states that 
accompany pretending, or that might be necessary for pretending. The theory only claims that 
pretend is itself a mental state, and that children’s recognition of pretense requires that they 
possess the mental state concept pretend. So the theory is not contradicted by demonstrations 
that children do not appreciate certain other mental states that typically accompany pretending 
(see German & Leslie, 2001 for extended discussion of these points). In fact, according to the 
mentalist account, children engage in theory of mind even as they fail the Moe task. When 
children wrongly judge that Moe is pretending, they represent Moe pretends that he is a 
kangaroo. Although this judgment is incorrect (i.e., Moe is not actually pretending he is a 
kangaroo), the mentalist view claims that children nonetheless represent Moe using the mental 
state concept pretend and therefore attribute a mental state to him (i.e., pretend).6 
Although findings from the Moe the troll tasks might not show that the mentalist account 
is wrong, they are still interesting. In failing the tasks, children show difficulty appreciating that 
to pretend to be X one has to know about X. Their failure suggests that they do not appreciate the 
connection between know and pretend, and implies a developmental course in which young 
children possess concepts like know and pretend, and only later come to learn relations between 
them (German & Leslie, 2001). If it is difficult to believe that children could possess the concept 
pretend without appreciating the connection between pretending and knowing, then consider 
findings from a modified version of the Moe task conducted by German and Leslie (2001). Their 
experiments included versions of the task that did not concern pretending at all. Instead, these 
tasks assessed children’s attributions of beliefs. Children age four to six years watched a scenario 
in which a bag hops up and down because a rabbit is inside it. Children were then told about a 
troll who sees the hopping bag, but not the rabbit inside, and were also told that the troll does not 
know that there are such animals as rabbits. When asked if the troll thinks a rabbit is in the bag, 
many children incorrectly said “yes.” Children’s error is similar to that in the original Moe the 
troll task. If the troll does not know about rabbits, then the troll cannot believe that a rabbit is in 
the bag.  
Using the standard interpretation of Moe the troll tasks, it should be concluded that 
children who failed this “knowing–believing” task lack the mental state concept believe, and are 
therefore not mentalists about believing, and only appreciate the behavioral component of 
believing. These conclusions are deeply problematic because there is no obvious behavioral 
component to the troll’s belief that a rabbit is in the bag. Also, many children who failed the 
knowing-believing task passed a standard false belief task, a task that provides a conservative 
test of children’s possession of the mental state concept believe (Bloom & German, 2000). So it 
is difficult to treat children’s failure of the knowing-believing task as evidence that they lack this 
concept. The more plausible explanation for children’s failure of knowing-believing tasks is that 
children have difficult appreciating the relationship between believing and knowing, much as 
children in standard Moe the troll tasks have difficulty appreciating the relationship between 
pretending and knowing.  
It seems, then, that findings from the Moe the troll task do not bear on the mentalist 
account. Nonetheless, some alternative theory might better explain children’s pretend play. The 
next section outlines the dominant theoretical alternative to the mentalist account, the behavioral 
theory.  
The Behavioral Account 
According to the behavioral theory, children only recognize and represent pretense as a form of 
behavior. Several different versions of this account have been proposed (e.g., Lillard, 1993a, 
2001; Nichols & Stich, 2000, 2003; Perner, 1991; Rakoczy, Tomasello, & Striano, 2004). The 
current discussion of the behavioral theory relies on the version proposed by Nichols and Stich 
because it is the clearest and most precise proposal, and allows the implications of the behavioral 
theory to be made evident most easily. Nonetheless, the conclusions of this discussion are not 
specific to Nichols and Stich’s formulation, and extend to all other versions.  
The behavioral theory claims that young children (e.g., less than four years of age) lack 
propositional attitude mental state concepts. To the extent that these children reason about 
pretense, it is only as a form of behavior. According to the behavioral account, when Max raises 
an empty cup to his lips and makes slurping noises, Sally will not be able to represent that Max 
pretends there is juice in the cup (and that he drinks it). Representing Max as pretending this 
would require Sally to possess the propositional attitude concept pretend, and as a young child 
Sally lacks this.  
Instead, Sally is claimed to view instances of pretending P via the behavioral description, 
behaving in a way that would be appropriate if P were true (Nichols & Stich, 2000, 2003).7 For 
instance, to make sense of what Max does with the cup, Sally might represent, Max behaves in a 
way that would be appropriate if the cup contained juice. This account may seem compelling 
because if there were juice in the cup, then Max might drink it, in which case it would be 
appropriate for him to raise the cup to his lips and make slurping sounds. This same behavioral 
description is used to explain why Max produces the behaviors he does. He does so because he 
has decided to behave in a way that would be appropriate if the cup contained juice. 
Difficulties for the Behavioral Account 
Although the behavioral theory seems to provide a simple account of how children engage in and 
recognize pretend play, it faces many problems (see Friedman & Leslie, 2007 for an extended 
critique of the behavioral theory). One set of problems arises because the behavioral theory is too 
broad, and predicts that children will view many non-pretend behaviors just as they view genuine 
instances of pretending. A second set of problems arise because the account is too narrow—
many common forms of pretense do not fit the behavioral description and on this account should 
neither be produced nor recognized by children.  
Just about any behavior can be viewed as behaving in a way that would be appropriate if 
P. Suppose Max is drinking tea and he uses a straw to stir the tea. Sally might represent, Max is 
behaving in a way that would be appropriate if the straw were a spoon. Even though he is not 
pretending, and is just stirring, the behavioral theory predicts that Sally will represent Max just 
as she would if he were actually pretending. More precisely, the behavioral theory predicts that 
Sally will treat instances of genuine pretense as seriously as she treats everyday behaviors such 
as stirring coffee with a straw (because the behavioral theory makes no mention of pretense 
being playful). Because just about any behavior is consistent with the behavioral description, the 
description does not allow children to discriminate behaviors produced in pretense from ordinary 
non-pretend behaviors. 
Contrary to this, it might seem that children should be able to differentiate pretend and  
ordinary behaviors because pretend behaviors are distinct in featuring manner cues (e.g., 
exaggerated motions, knowing smiles). And in fact, manner cues do help children recognize 
pretend play (Lillard & Witherington, 2004; Ma & Lillard, 2006; Richert & Lillard, 2004). 
However, the behavioral account makes no mention of manner cues; they are nowhere in the 
behavioral description, behaves in a way that would be appropriate if P. On the contrary, the 
more manner cues are incorporated into the behaviors of pretense, the less this behavior fits the 
behavioral description. When Max loudly slurps while pretending to drink (exaggerated 
behavior), he does not really behave in a way that would be appropriate if he were drinking. 
People do not usually slurp loudly when drinking. Perhaps the behavioral account could be 
modified to incorporate manner cues. However, it is challenging to think of how to do this in a 
way that is not clumsy and post hoc. In contrast, manner cues fall naturally out of the view that 
children are mentalists about pretense because in that account, people engaging in pretense seek 
to behave in a way that expresses they are pretending and not just behaving regularly.  
Further difficulties arise for the mentalist account because it is too narrow. Commonly 
occurring forms of pretend play do not fit the behavioral description, and so it has difficulty 
explaining how children recognize (and produce) these forms of pretense (see chapter 12 for a 
taxonomy of different types of pretend play). Pretend play scenarios often involve the 
representation of some agent who carries out an action. Sometimes a person serves as the agent. 
For example, when Max pretends there is juice in the cup, he carries out the action of drinking. 
The behavioral account is most compelling in such instances (i.e., in which the person enacting 
the pretense serves as the agent). When Max raises the cup to his lips, it might seem plausible 
that Sally could view him as behaving in a way that would be appropriate if the cup contained 
juice (although again, if he was really going to behave appropriately he would touch the cup to 
his lips).8 
The behavioral account has considerable difficulty, though, when an object serves as the 
agent. If Max puts the cup to a teddy bear’s lips and makes slurping noises, Max still pretends 
the cup contains juice, but now the teddy bear (an object) is the agent carrying out the action of 
“drinking.” Likewise, if Max pushes a block of wood along the table while he says “vrrrm,” he 
pretends that the block is the agent carrying out the actions of driving and of making the “vrrrm” 
sound. However,when Max does these things, his behavior does not correspond with the 
behavioral description, and so the behavioral theory is unable to explain why Max produces 
these commonly occurring pretend behaviors, nor how Sally and other children might interpret 
them. Consider first the act of pushing the block on the table in pretending it is a car. According 
to the behavioral theory, Sally can make sense of Max’s behavior by representing that he 
behaves in a way that would be appropriate if the block were a car. However, in moving the 
block, Max does not behave himself in a way that would be appropriate if it were a car. People 
do not normally move cars by pushing them. For Max to behave in a way that would be 
appropriate if the block were a car, he might open and shut its doors, sit in it, drive it, or honk its 
horn, although none of these actions can actually be carried out with a wooden block. So Sally is 
left with no way to understand why Max moves the block. It could be that the behavioral account 
could be expanded to help explain why Max moves the block (see Friedman & Leslie, 2007 for 
some suggested fixes), but greater difficulties concern why Max says “vrrrm” while pushing the 
block. 
When Max makes “vrrrm” sounds while pushing the block, he pretends these sounds are 
made by the block/car. Pretend play often involves such sounds, which are represented as being 
made by an object (i.e., rather than by the person actually making them). Such pretend sounds 
are problematic for the behavioral theory because when Max goes “vrrrm” he does not behave in 
a way that would be appropriate if the car were making those sounds. If the car were making 
“vrrrm” sounds, then Max would probably be silent, and there would be no reason for him to 
make them. It might make sense for Max to make “vrrrm” sounds when he pretends to be a car, 
but this is not what he pretends when he pushes the block. Hence, Sally cannot successfully 
interpret Max’s behavior via the original behavioral description, and so she will be left viewing 
Max alone, and not the block/car, as the source of the “vrrrm” sounds.  
This difficulty for the behavioral account extends to pretend speech. Suppose Max holds 
a teddy bear, and lightly shakes it, while saying in a gruff voice, “I’m hungry, give me food.” In 
behaving in this way, Max pretends that the bear is the one speaking and making the request. If 
Sally comprehends this pretense, she should fulfill the request by “feeding” the bear. However, if 
the behavioral theory were correct, then it would be difficult to see how Sally might comprehend 
the request. As with the example of the block/car, Max cannot be viewed as behaving in a way 
that would be appropriate if the bear were making the request. If the bear were making the 
request, it might be appropriate for Max to listen to the request, or respond to the request. But 
there is no reason why he should utter the request himself. In uttering the request Max might be 
viewed as behaving in a way that would be appropriate if he were a teddy bear making the 
request. But if Max’s behavior were interpreted in this way (which would be odd given that 
teddy bears cannot speak), Max would still be viewed as the source of the request. So the request 
would have to be fulfilled by “feeding” Max and not the bear, opposite to what should happen 
with the pretense that the bear is the speaker. 
It is difficult to see how the behavioral theory might be modified or expanded to explain 
how children comprehend pretend sounds and speech. As an alternative, the theory could be 
defended by denying that children do comprehend pretend sounds and speech. Until recently no 
research investigated children’s comprehension of pretend sounds and speech, and the little 
existing research found that pretend sounds do not improve recognition of pretense in 18-month-
olds (Lillard & Witherington, 2004), and barely improve recognition in older children (Richert & 
Lillard, 2004). Thus, it seems possible that young children might ignore these sounds, or only 
loosely associate them with the accompanying actions.  
However, recent findings confirm that two- and three-year-olds do understand what a 
pretender is trying to accomplish with pretend speech (Friedman, Neary, Burnstein, & Leslie, 
2010). In a series of experiments, two- and three-year-olds sat before the experimenter and a 
teddy bear, who each had a box. Children were given Lego blocks, and then heard the 
experimenter utter requests to “put a block in my box.” The experimenter sometimes uttered the 
requests normally, and other times with the pretense that the bear was speaking. On the 
“pretend” trials, the experimenter spoke in a gruff voice while lightly moving the bear. Children 
at both ages correctly placed blocks in the experimenter’s box when she spoke normally, and in 
the bear’s box in the pretend trials. It cannot be that children only put blocks in the bear’s trial 
because they were cued by the experimenter moving the bear. In one experiment, the bear was 
also moved in the reality trials (i.e., with the experimenter speaking in her regular voice), and 
children still correctly put the blocks in her box. Findings from the pretend trials instead suggest 
that children shared in the experimenter’s pretense that the bear was speaking. 
The behavioral account cannot explain children’s success in this experiment. If children 
represented pretense via the behavioral description, they could not interpret requests in pretend 
trials as coming from the bear. Children’s success is easily explained, however, by the mentalist 
account. According to this account, children succeeded because they were able to represent the 
experimenter as pretending—they could represent the experimenter (or we) pretend that the bear 
uttered the request “put a block in my cup.” By speaking in a gruff voice, the experimenter drew 
attention to her utterance, and conveyed that she was pretending that she was not the one uttering 
it. By shaking the bear, she conveyed that she was pretending that the bear was the one actually 
speaking.  
In sum, although the behavioral theory is somewhat compelling for pretend play in which 
the pretender is an agent of the pretend actions, it quickly become convoluted when applied to 
other types of pretend play, and has particular difficulty with pretend sounds and speech. 
Moreover, the theory predicts that children should mistake many regular behaviors for instances 
of pretending, and fails to explain why the behaviors of pretend play typically feature manner 
cues. It seems doubtful that children view pretend play via the behavioral description, behaving 
in a way that would be appropriate if P were true. 
The Flagging Account 
Another alternative to the mentalist view is the “flagging” account proposed by Harris and 
Kavanaugh (1993; also see Harris, 1994, 1995, 2000). According to this account, children 
represent pretense by “flagging” (or labeling) objects with make-believe identities and 
properties. For example, when Max puts the empty cup to his lips and makes slurping sounds, he 
does this because he flags the cup, this cup contains make-believe tea. Sally also flags the cup 
this way, and this allows her to make sense of his behavior—Max puts the cup to his lips because 
he drinks the (make-believe) tea.9 
Like the behavioral view, this account denies that young children represent pretense with 
the propositional attitude concept pretend, but unlike the behavioral view, the flagging account 
does not restrict children to representing pretense via the behavioral description. On this view, 
children are accorded a way of representing pretense that substantially differs from how they 
represent regular non-pretend behavior—only in pretense are objects flagged as having make-
believe properties. Even so, the flagging account is vague in explaining why pretenders behave 
as they do. Why does Max not put the empty teacup to his lips if he is drinking? Only the tea was 
flagged as make-believe, not the drinking. Should both be flagged?  
A more concrete challenge to the flagging account is posed by pretend sounds and 
speech. Again, Max makes “vrrrm” sounds when Max pushes the block, and allaccounts of 
pretend play must explain why he makes these sounds, and how Sally interprets this behavior. 
The flagging account might claim that Max produces these sounds because make-believe cars are 
expected to go “vrrrm.” (This suggestion is speculative because as noted in the preceding 
paragraph, the flagging account is vague about how pretenders should behave.) But assuming 
that make-believe cars are expected to go “vrrrm,” it would only make sense for Max to make 
the sounds if he were a make-believe car (i.e., if he were flagged Max is a make-believe car). But 
when Max pushes the block, the block is the make-believe car. So it should make the “vrrrm” 
sounds, not Max.  
Alternatively, Max and Sally might flag the sounds, these sounds are make-believe car 
sounds. But this proposal does not help. Representing the sounds as make-believe car sounds 
does not mean that they are made by the block/car. They would still be make-believe car sounds 
if Max were the make-believe car, and this would be especially plausible given that he, and not 
the block, makes the sounds. A further repair might be to flag the sounds, these sounds are make-
believe being made by this make-believe car (i.e., the block). With this complicated flag, Sally 
and Max may succeed in representing the block/car as making the “vrrrm” sounds. But this still 
does not explain why Max makes the sounds. In the flagging account, Max and Sally do not 
represent Max pretends P, and so they cannot view him as pretending the sounds are made by the 
block/car. Second, it is difficult to envisage why Sally or Max would ever represent the “vrrrm” 
sounds with this complicated flag. How would they ever hit upon the idea of flagging Max’s 
sounds in this way? The flagging theory’s difficulty with pretend sounds extends to pretend 
speech. But as noted, children succeed in following pretend speech at age two, and correctly 
modify their response to requests depending on whether the experimenter produces them 
normally or with the pretense that they are made by a teddy bear (Friedman et al., 2010). It is 
very difficult to see how children could succeed (and without showing any signs of being 
puzzled) if they were limited to flagging the requests, the bear, or both.  
In quick sum, both the flagging and behavioral accounts seem to have difficulty 
explaining basic features of pretend play. But of course, this does not imply that the mentalist 
account is correct. The next section revisits the mentalist account, and challenges an essential 
claim of the account. Also, a new alternative to the mentalist account (perhaps better described 
as a modification to it) is described. This account claims that children do represent pretend play 
via the concept pretend, but endorses a different view of what kind of concept it is.  
Pretend Play as Communication 
The mentalist view claims that pretend is a mental state. From this it follows that recognizing 
that someone is pretending requires attributing a mental state (i.e., pretend), and is therefore a 
form of theory of mind. But how do we know whether pretend is a mental state? As noted, we 
might expect pretend is a mental state because it relates an agent (e.g., Max) to a propositional 
content (e.g., the cup contains juice), as do propositional attitude mental states like believe and 
intend. However, this does not show that pretend must be a mental state because say, sing, and 
write also relate agents and propositional contents even though they are not mental states. For 
example, Max can say that the cup contains juice, even though say is not a mental state. Hence, 
pretend might not be a mental state.10 
Moreover, there is a compelling reason to believe that pretend is not a mental state. 
Considered individually, mental states like believe, desire, and intend do not require behavior. 
But pretend play does require behavior. Max can believe a cup contains juice even if he does not 
drink the juice, and he can want or intend to drink the juice even if he never gets around to doing 
so. But it would be odd to assert that Max pretends the cup contains juice if he is quietly reading 
a book with no cup or juice in sight. At best he could be described as imagining that juice is in 
the cup, or as thinking about this.11 For actual pretense, Max has to behave in a way that conveys 
what he pretends. This requirement for behavior marks an important difference between 
pretending and mental states like imagining, believing, desiring, and even intending. If 
pretending requires behavior, it is difficult to view it as just a mental state. But it is hard to be 
certain—perhaps pretend is a distinct mental state that can only be held (or at least attributed) if 
accompanied by behavior.  
The preceding considerations do not conclusively show that pretend is not a mental state. 
Nonetheless, I believe it is possible to develop a plausible alternative account built on the 
premise that pretend is not a mental state. The basic claim of this alternative account is that 
rather than being a mental state, pretend is better understood as a form of communication or 
expression, similar in important ways to activities like drawing, painting and writing. At the 
outset, it must be acknowledged that this account is extremely influenced by the claim that 
pretend play is a form of ostensive communication (Leslie & Happé, 1989) and so rather than 
being viewed as a new account of pretend play, what follows might better be viewed as a 
description of what follows if the existing claim that pretense is ostensive communication is 
accepted, while the claim that pretend is a mental state is denied. 
To develop this account, consider drawing. When people draw, they use lines (and may 
other kinds of markings) to represent things. The lines in a drawing can represent a horse, a tea 
party, a woman talking on the phone, and so on. Drawing is communicative because the “artist” 
forms the lines such that other people are typically able to infer that the drawing represents 
something (i.e., rather than being nothing more than a collection of lines and other markings), 
and to infer what it represented in the drawing; viewers of a drawing of a horse will typically 
infer it is a drawing (i.e., a kind of representation) and that it represents a horse. In recognizing 
that someone is drawing a picture of a horse, people can represent that the artist is representing a 
horse even though draw is not a mental state. Attribution of mental states may be necessary to 
interpret drawings because lines (and other markings) can only represent something because this 
was intended by the artist. But to the extent that people consider the attitude the artist takes to the 
lines in a drawing, it is mostly by considering what the artist intends. For example, people might 
conclude that a certain line is a drawing of a horse if they judge that the artist intended that it 
represent a horse; even two-year-olds appear to reflect on artists’ intentions in this way when 
interpreting drawings (Preissler & Bloom, 2008; also see Gelman & Bloom, 2000). But the main 
point is that appreciating drawing does not require attributing mental states specific to drawing.  
Pretend play is very similar to drawing. In a drawing, lines (and other visual markings) 
can represent many things, and the same is true for the objects and actions in pretend play. 
Drawing a horse and pretending that a stick is a horse are two different ways of representing a 
horse, and both are produced in ways that convey that they are representations and what it is they 
represent. Therefore, just as people can recognize drawings without attributing a dedicated 
mental state draw, it is plausible that they can also recognize pretend play without pretend being 
a mental state. As with drawing, the recognition of pretend play only requires people to 
recognize that certain actions and objects are intended to serve as representations, and to infer 
what it is the pretender intends they represent. For example, when Max lifts the empty cup close 
to his mouth and makes a slurping sound, people judge that he is pretending because the manner 
in which he behaves suggests that he intends to represent something, and specifically he intends 
his actions to represent (or convey) that juice is in the cup, and that he is drinking it. 
Against this analogy with drawing, it might be pointed out that people talk about 
pretending and drawing very differently. We say “he pretends this stick is a horse,” but not “he 
draws this line is a horse.” This might seem to suggest that the way we represent drawings and 
pretend play are fundamentally different. But this seems wrong. People could not appreciate that 
a drawing is a drawing (and not a real object, nor just a collection of haphazard lines) if they did 
not appreciate that the drawing consists of lines that represent (or are intended to represent) 
objects. It is also worth pointing out that drawing and pretend have other parallels. A crucial 
claim of the mentalist account, and one handled poorly by competing accounts, is that people can 
pretend that P even when P is true (Leslie, 1994). For example, in pretend play it is possible for a 
daughter to pretend to be a daughter (e.g., “Lets pretend that you’re a mommy and I’m your 
kid!” A parallel occurrence arises in drawing when part of a drawing depicts a drawing. In a 
drawing of an artist drawing a line, that line represents a line.  
The claim that children view pretend play as communication (or representational activity) 
is very similar to the mentalist account. Like the mentalist account, this account claims that 
children interpret pretend play by processing representations like Max pretends the cup contains 
juice. And as in the mentalist account, processing such representations is meta-representational 
because Max is represented as pretending, and pretending is representational (i.e. though as 
communicative behavior, not because it is a propositional attitude mental state). The key 
difference from the mentalist account is that pretend is claimed to not be a mental state. This 
move strongly weakens the parallels between pretending and believing; instead pretend is viewed 
as more akin to representational activities like drawing, painting, and writing. But even so, the 
account still implies that recognizing pretend play requires theory of mind to the extent that 
observers must infer what the pretender intends to represent. Hence, from the perspective of this 
view of pretend play, the chief deficit of the behavioral and flagging accounts is not that they 
give children too little credit for reasoning about mental states in pretend play, but rather that 
they overlook the communicative (and representational) nature of pretend play.  
Viewed chiefly as a communicative and representational activity, new questions about 
pretend play arise. Why are children endowed from early in development with the ability to 
transform the objects around them into representations? It could be that pretend play is just for 
fun. Alternatively, if pretend play is fundamentally communicative this might be to some end; 
the communicative nature of pretend play might allow children to acquire knowledge from 
others (Sutherland & Friedman, 2012, in press). 
  
References 
Astington, J. W., & Jenkins, J. M. (1995). Theory of mind development and social 
understanding. Cognition & Emotion, 9, 151–165. 
Bloom, P., & German, T. P. (2000). Two reasons to abandon the false belief task as a test of 
theory of mind. Cognition, 77, B25–B31. 
Bosco, F. M., Friedman, O., & Leslie, A. M. (2006). Recognition of pretend and real actions in 
play by 1- and 2-year-olds: Early success and why they fail. Cognitive Development, 21, 
3–10.  
Friedman, O., & Leslie, A. M. (2007). The conceptual underpinning of pretense: Pretending is 
not ‘behaving as if’. Cognition, 105, 103–124.  
Friedman, O., Neary, K. R., Burnstein, C. L., & Leslie, A. M. (2010). Is young children's 
recognition of pretense metarepresentational or merely behavioral? Evidence from 2- and 
3-year-olds' understanding of pretend sounds and speech. Cognition, 115, 314–319. 
Gelman, S. A., & Bloom, P. (2000).  Young children are sensitive to how an object was created 
when deciding what to name it. Cognition, 76, 91-103. 
German, T. P., & Leslie, A. M. (2001). Children’s inferences from “knowing” to “pretending” 
and “believing”. British Journal of Developmental Psychcology, 19, 59–83. 
Gopnik, A., & Wellman, H. (1994). The theory theory. In L. Hirschfeld & S. Gelman 
(Eds.), Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Harris, P. L. (1994). Understanding pretence. In C. Lewis, & P. Mitchell (Eds.), The origins of 
an understanding of mind. Brighton, UK: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Harris, P. L. (1995). Imagining and pretending. In M. Davies, & T. Stone (Eds.), Mental 
simulation: Evaluations and applications, pp. 170–184. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 
Harris, P. L. (2000). The work of the imagination. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 
Harris, P. L., & Kavanaugh, R. D. (1993). Young children's understanding of pretense. 
Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 58, 1-107. 
Harris, P. L., Kavanaugh, R. D., & Meredith, M. C. (1994). Young children's comprehension of 
pretend episodes: The integration of successive actions. Child Development, 65, 16–30. 
Leslie, A. M. (1987). Pretense and representation: The origins of “theory of mind.” 
Psychological Review, 94, 412–426. 
Leslie, A. M. (1994). Pretending and believing: Issues in the theory of ToMM. Cognition, 50, 
211–238. 
Leslie, A. M. (2002). Pretense and representation revisited. In N. L. Stein, P. J. Bauer, & M. 
Rabinowitz (Eds.), Representation, memory and development: Essays in Honor of Jean 
Mandler, pp. 103–114. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Leslie, A. M., & Happé, F. (1989). Autism and ostensive communication: The relevance of 
metarepresentation. Development and Psychopathology, 1, 205–212. 
Lillard, A. S. (1993a). Pretend play skills and the child's theory of mind. Child Development, 64, 
348–371. 
Lillard, A. S. (1993b). Young children's conceptualization of pretense: Action or mental 
representational state? Child Development, 64, 372–386. 
Lillard, A. S. (1996). Body or mind: Children’s categorizing of pretense. Child Development, 67, 
1717–1734. 
Lillard, A. S. (2001). Pretend play as twin earth: A social-cognitive analysis. Developmental 
Review, 21, 495–531. 
Lillard, A. S., & Witherington, D. S. (2004). Mothers' behavior modifications during pretense 
snacks and their possible signal value for toddlers. Developmental Psychology, 40, 95–
113. 
Ma, L. & Lillard, A. S. (2006). Where is the real cheese? Young children’s ability to 
discriminate real and pretend acts. Child Development, 77, 1762–1777. 
Nichols S., & Stich, S. (2000). A cognitive theory of pretense. Cognition, 74, 115–147. 
Nichols, S., & Stich, S. (2003). Mindreading: An integrated account of pretense, self-awareness 
and understanding other minds. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Onishi, K. H., Baillargeon, R., & Leslie, A. M. (2007). 15-month-old infants detect violations in 
pretend scenarios. Acta Psychologica, 124, 106-128. 
Perner, J. (1991). Understanding the representational mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Preissler, M. A., & Bloom, P. (2008). Two-year-olds use artist intention to understand drawings. 
Cognition, 106, 512–518. 
Rakoczy, H., Tomasello, M., & Striano, T. (2004). Young children know that trying is not 
pretending: A test of the "behaving-as-if" construal of children’s understanding of 
pretense. Developmental Psychology, 40, 388–399. 
Richert, R., & Lillard, A. S. (2004) Observers’ proficiency at identifying pretend acts based on 
different behavioral cues. Cognitive Development, 19, 223–240. 
Rosen, C. S., Schwebel, D. C., & Singer, J. L. (1997). Preschoolers' attributions of mental states 
in pretense. Child Development, 66, 1133–1142. 
Schwebel, D., Rosen, C., & Singer, J. L. (1999). Preschoolers' pretend play and theory of mind: 
The role of jointly conducted pretense. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 17, 
333–348. 
Sutherland, S.L. & Friedman, O. (in press). Just pretending can be really learning: Children use 
pretend-play as a source for acquiring generic knowledge. Developmental Psychology. 
Sutherland, S. & Friedman, O. (2012). Preschoolers acquire general knowledge by sharing in 
pretense. Child Development, 83, 1064-1071. 
Taylor, M., & Carlson, S. M. (1997). The relation between individual differences in fantasy and 
theory of mind. Child Development, 68, 436–455. 
Walker-Andrews, A., & Harris, P. L. (1993). Young children's comprehension of pretend causal 
sequences. Developmental Psychology, 29, 915–921. 
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory mind development: 
The truth about false-belief. Child Development, 72, 655–684. 
  
Notes 
 
1This might sound awkward in the case of want and intend, because in English this would more 
likely be expressed, as Max wants (or intends) the cup in the fridge to contain juice. 
 
2By contrast, theory of mind does not concern the possession of mental states. Hence, whether 
young children (or dogs, or robots) have beliefs (or hopes, or imaginings) is not a question about 
theory of mind. But whether young children (or dogs, or robots) can attribute beliefs (or hopes, 
or imaginings) is. 
 
3More formally, the mentalist account claims that Sally will represent: Max pretends (of) this cup 
(that) “it contains juice.” 
 
4This reasoning makes the case for why the young child’s ability to represent others as 
pretending is a type of theory of mind reasoning. What about when children engage in pretend 
play by themselves? When Sally pretends that there is juice in an empty cup, and pretends to 
drink it, she presumably represents herself as pretending. For instance, she might represent I 
pretend this empty cup contains juice. As such she attributes a mental state, pretending, to 
herself, and represents herself as representing. Nonetheless, this chapter focuses on how children 
recognize and represent others’ pretense. 
 
5If Max was trying to deceive Sally, then he might want her to draw such false conclusions. 
However, in pretend play the aim is not deceptive, the aim is to make the pretense obvious.  
 
6Similar points apply to the finding that children less than six years old often categorize instances 
of pretending with physical rather than mental processes, and often deny that pretending requires 
the mind and brain (Lillard, 1996). The mentalist account claims that pretend is a mental state, 
and that children use their concept of this mental state to represent people’s pretense. The 
account does not claim that children understand that pretend is a mental state.  
 
7Alternative formulations of the behavioral theory sometimes claim that children view pretense 
as behaving-as-if P. However, it is difficult to know what this phrase means, if it is not 
equivalent to Stich and Nichols’ behavioral description. Also, it is also easy to absent-mindedly 
think of “behave-as-if” as synonymous with “pretend.” Of course, if there were no difference 
between these terms then there would be no difference between the behavioral and mentalist 
accounts of pretend play, and moreover the behavioral theory mightno longer be particularly 
behavioral because it would covertly make reference to the propositional attitude pretend. 
 
8Things already become strained for the behavioral account if similar examples of such pretense 
are considered. For instance, if Max runs around with his arms outstretched, it would not be 
difficult to recognize that he pretends that he is an airplane (and that his arms are wings). But is 
he really behaving in a way that would be appropriate if he were an airplane? If he were an 
airplane, would it be appropriate for him to stick his arms out? 
 
9The terms pretend and make-believe are synonymous (or close to it), and so it might be noted 
that the flagging account does credit children with the concept pretend. However, in the flagging 
account pretend is not a propositional attitude, and is never used to form representations such as 
Max pretends the cup contains juice. Instead children use this concept to represent objects as 
having certain counterfactual properties and identities. To avoid confusion with the propositional 
attitude concept pretend, and in keeping with Harris and Kavanaugh’s (1993) own description of 
their theory, the current description sticks with make-believe in describing the flagging account. 
 
10This is not to deny that mental states are not required to actually engage in pretend play. 
Obviously, pretend play depends on mental states, as do countless other human activities that are 
not themselves mental states. The point for now is that only that pretend itself might not be a 
mental state. 
 
11The claim that pretending requires behavior is not contradicted by the observation that Max 
might remain very still while enacting certain kinds of pretense. Max might remain still if he 
pretends to sleep, but this stillness serves to convey what he pretends. We could not say that Max 
pretends to sleep, though, if he were running about the room with his eyes wide open. 
